Then L is not E-Recursively Enumerable in any member of L via a forcing argument inspired by Friedberg [1]. This approach leads to an extension of Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness. §1. Introduction. The notation {e}(x) was introduced by Kleene; x was a nonnegative integer intended as input for a finitary effective procedure coded by e. Sometime later Kleene [3] redefined the notion of effective procedure to allow x to be an object of finite type and computations to be infinite wellfounded trees. A partial function F : V → V is partial E-recursive iff ∃e∀x F (x) is defined and equal to y iff {e}(x) converges to y.
§1. Introduction. The notation {e}(x) was introduced by Kleene; x was a nonnegative integer intended as input for a finitary effective procedure coded by e. Sometime later Kleene [3] redefined the notion of effective procedure to allow x to be an object of finite type and computations to be infinite wellfounded trees. Finally Normann [6] and Moschovakis [5] elevated x to the status of an arbitrary set. (A curious reader might consult [8] .)
A partial function F : V → V is partial E-recursive iff ∃e∀x F (x) is defined and equal to y iff {e}(x) converges to y.
The meaning of convergence: applying {e} to x results in a wellfounded computation tree in Ad 1 (x), the least Σ 1 admissible set ⊇ tc{x}, the transitive closure of {x}. Notation: read {e}(x) ↓ as {e}(x) converges, and {e}(x) ↑ as {e}(x) diverges.
A
class A is E-Recursively Enumerable in b iff
∃e A = {x | {e}(x, b) ↓}.
A is E-Recursively Enumerable iff ∃e A = {x | {e}(x) ↓}; d is E-recursive in c iff ∃e d = {e}(c).
Then L is not E-recusively enumerable in any member.of L.
The standard Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness arguments are enough to prove Theorem 1 if the "member of L" belongs to L( L 1 ). Otherwise something more is needed. In this paper "more" means chains of elementary substructures and forcing.
There is a conceptual gap between "constructible" and "E-recursively enumerable." A set x is constructible iff there exists an ordinal such that x is a first order definable subset of L( ); c is a member of {x | {e}(x) ↓} iff there exists a wellfounded computation tree E-recursive in c that witnesses the convergence of {e}(c). In short "constructible" is less constructive than "E-recursively enumerable," much much less constructive. It is plausible that "E-recursively enumerable" is at the bottom of a hierarchy of definability with "constructibility" at the top. §2. Preferred nonconstructible sets. Suppose is a limit,
It follows that (∀y ∈ L( )) (x y); i.e., x is not a bounded subset of L( ). The notion of amenability plays a leading role in the play of ideas below. Suppose V ̸ = L. 1 Let be the least such that some subset of is not in L. Then every unbounded subset of is amenable, because is an L-cardinal. Some proof:
Proof. Suppose L thinks is a singular cardinal of cofinality . In L there is an ascending sequence of cardinals { | < } such that
Every cardinal of L below is a cardinal of V . Choose a nonconstructible Z ⊆ . For each < , define c( ) to be the least ordinal that encodes Z ∩ as a constructible set. Note that c( ) ∈ +1 ; range(c) is a singular sequence thorough of length ;
The L-cardinal was defined at the beginning of Section 2. A Σ 1 admissible L(α) with the following properties is needed to study generic solutions of {e}(x, b)↓ . 
Construction of L(α).
Let ∈ H cf( ) be the least Σ 1 admissible ordinal > κ + . Recall
the map that collapses an extensional set to a transitive set. Define
There is a preferred sequence k of length cofinal in gc(α).
Proposition 3.2. The range of k is an amenable subset of gc(α). Every member of the range of k is a limit ordinal; k is strictly increasing.
Traditional set-forcing preserves Σ 1 admissibility; i.e., the null forcing condition forces Σ 1 admissibility. But if α is uncountable, a generic subset of gc(α) may not exist. Clause(F3) helps solve that problem in Section 4. Clause (F4) leads to a generic outside L. [9] shows that the Σ α 2 cofinality of gc(α) equals the Σ α 2 cofinality of α, and thereby enables his "blocking" method, which empowers Σ 1 admissibility to do some Σ 2 recursions.
Forcing conditions are denoted by p, q, r, . . . ; p is a function from some
the domain of G is gc(α) and its values are forcing conditions; in addition,
Proof. For each < α, let v be a variable that ranges over L( , G).
For u ∈ e and q ≤ p, define k(u, q) to be the L-least < r, > such that
The domain of k is a member of L(α) and k is Σ α 1 . Hence { | ∃r ⟨r, ⟩ ∈ range(k)} is bounded above by some 0 < α, and p
and {e}(G, b) converges, then its convergence is witnessed by a wellfounded computation tree in L(α, G); if {e}(G, b) diverges, then some infinite descending path of the computation tree is first order definable over L(α, G). (For more detail see [8] , [7] .)
(i) K is ranked; i.e., rank less than α; (ii) K is ∃xF and F is ranked; (iii) K is ∀ u∈e ∃vF (u, v).
Note: By Proposition 3.6, a search for a p to force ∀ u∈e ∃vF (u, v) is the same as a search for a p to force ∃w∀ u∈e ∃ v∈w F (u, v) .
The construction of a sufficiently generic G will be a recursion of length gc(α).
Proof. Suppose K is a ranked sentence of rank less than α. If K is forced by some p ∈ G, then L(α, G) |= K. Otherwise ¬K is forced by some p ∈ G and L(α, G) |= ¬K.
Suppose K is ∃xF (x), F (x) has rank less than α, and K is forced by some p ∈ G. Then p F (d ) for some term d , and so L(α, G) |= ∃xF (x). Suppose ¬K is forced by some p ∈ G. Thus p ∀x¬F (x). Then for all d , (∃q ≤ p) q ∈ G and q ¬F (d ), and so L(α, G) |= ¬K.
Suppose L(α, G) |= ∀ u∈e ∃vF (u, v), and F (u, v) has rank less than α. Then ∃p ∈ G p ∀ u∈e ∃vF (u, v). Hence by Proposition 3.6, p ∃w∀ u∈e ∃ v∈w F (u, v) .
⊣ §4. Forcing non-enumerability. First the plan, and then the details, for forcing non-enumerability. Suppose in hope of a contradiction that ∃ b ∈ L and e such that Case 1: is a limit.
Case 2: definition of p +1 .
The sequence p ( < ) defined above is definable by a Σ α 1 (with Q 2 as a parameter) recursion. Case 0: p 0 = 0. Case 1: is a limit. 
Proof. Define Q 1 and Q 2 as in the proof of Proposition 4.1. (A1) s is an amenable subset of L( s ) ( s is a limit.) (A2) for each member y of the cone above s there is a z ∈ A 1 (y) such that z is a solution of P(x).
The assumption of amenability in (A1) is an essential ingredient of the upcoming forcing argument. There are two forcing constructions below that cooperate to prove Theorem 5.1. The first constructs a generic in L, the second a generic in the cone above the given solution s.
In brief: By (A2) a generic G in the cone above s yields a solution constructible from G forced by some condition p; then the first construction yields a generic G ∈ L that satisfies p and thereby a solution in L. 
Let be the least
, the collapsing map in the proof of (F5) in Section 3.
There exists a strictly increasing function C ∈ L with domain and range an unbounded set of (gc(α) ∩ limit ordinals) such that:
Proof. By induction on < , H ∩ κ + is a limit ordinal below κ C ∈ L, hence G belongs to the cone above s. Question. Can the leading role of amenability in this paper be diminished to a supporting part? §6. Acknowledgment. My thanks to a learned referee who made many improvements.
